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ON THE CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN 
EXPERIENCE: TOWARDS A HUMANISTIC 
MODE OF PHILOSOPHY FOR AFRICA
Abstract: There is no doubt that Africa today is confronted with many eco-
nomic, political, social, and developmental problems. The big question and the ba-
sic challenge is therefore how best we can tackle these problems especially as we 
begin and forge ahead in the third millennium. This paper attempts to elucidate a 
fundamental role that philosophy can play in this regard. It holds that philosophy, as 
a discipline in the humanities, can help shape fresh ideas that are humanistic in 
nature in the sense that they encourage free enquiry and social agreement which are 
vital pillars for a fair and prosperous society; for a society without such genuine 
humanistic values will show many of the symptoms which are present in contempo-
rary African societies. 
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Introduction
The choice of focus for the present paper is informed by the 
consideration of some practical problems identifiable in the socio-
political, cultural and economic realities of contemporary Africa. The 
paper does not place emphasis on goals to purse as individuals, but 
on reasonable and realistic ambitions to embrace as a people. Thus, 
as Africa begins the third millennium of the Calendar, a major stage 
in human history, it has become imperative for us to take stock as a 
people, reassess our situation in history, and where necessary, shape 
fresh ideas about directions in which to move. To this end, one rele-
vant question which must be raised and answered is this: What mental 
or intellectual posture must we adopt in order to recognise and select 230
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wise attitudes and policies for effectively responding to the present 
condition and for confronting the future? To refuse to raise such a 
question or to ignore it when raised is to leave matter to some un-
realistic prophets and irrational activists. In this paper, I argue that 
in addressing the contemporary African condition and confronting 
the looming future of the twenty first century, what is required is the 
adoption of a philosophical framework of a humanistic mode. Perhaps 
the proper way to begin is the exposition of some facts of experience.
Aspects of the African Experience
A rather bleak picture emerges from today’s Africa. This is 
informed by a number of factors which include the following:1
•  The shallow developmental legacies of European imperialism.
•  Blistering poverty, hunger and disease (now including a ca-
lamitous AIDS epidemic).
•  The repressive, corrupt, and inefficient governance of Afri-
can States by their own elites since independence.
•  Steep economic decline across the continent.
•  Crises of political legitimacy due to (1) – (4) above.
This list is by no means exhaustive of the African predica-
ment. It only reveals the complexity of the situation. For instance, the 
steep economic decline has brought many national economies to the 
verge of collapse. It has led to material deprivation in the land, with 
situation degenerating to outright destitution in many countries.
In Nigeria, for instance, the situation is such that financial mat-
ters gained prevalence over production matters. Even within compa-
nies and organisations the value of financial managers has replaced 
that of production managers. Medium to long-term productive invest-
ments are less popular, with the concept of economic change switch-
ing in meaning from expectations of growth to hopes of survival.2
Meanwhile, the reduction of productive investments and the 
insufficient creation of jobs in the formal economy, together with 
other factors (such as bureaucratic obstacles, tax evasion, every low 
1   Irele 1992: 32.
2   Alonso-Concheiro 1991: 74.231
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minimum wages etc) have created informal or underground econo-
mies.3 The result of all these is the emergence of a less governable 
society, as an increasing amount of activities occurs outside con-
trolled channels. There is, all over the land, a high level of social 
tension expressing itself sometimes as internal conflicts. In a more 
general sense, there abound, evidence of accumulated distress lead-
ing to a growing despair- a phenomenon which has assumed the 
dimension of existential angst.4
The gloomy economic reality is compounded by an unfa-
vourable political climate.5 This situation is underlined by graphic 
television pictures of starving refugees fleeing the ravages of civil 
wars in Rwanda, Somalia, Zaire, Sudan, Sierra-Leone and the now 
violence-ravaged Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, Tunisia, and Egypt, includ-
ing other ethnic and political violence. Indeed, a popular image of 
Africa now is that of ongoing politically induced disruption of life 
with the attendant insecurity and constant misery. Now, just as the 
politically orientation of any society is correlated to the prevailing 
economic condition, so are they inevitably tied together in the Af-
rican experience. Any attempt to proffer solution to the identified 
problems must keep this fact in view.
A very important component of the antecedent condition of 
Contemporary Africa can be located in the colonial experience. This 
as a matter of historical fact, constitutes a dividing line between 
the African past and present. It is, in the opinion of Peter Ekeh,6 an 
epoch whose enduring significance beyond the life span of the co-
lonial situation lies in the social, political and economic formations, 
developed from those changes provoked by the confrontations, con-
tradictions and incompatibilities in the colonial situation. Among 
the profound changes which Ekeh had in mind are emergent social 
structures which were neither indigenous nor migrant, but emerged 
to meet social needs of the new colonial environment such as trib-
alism and ethnicity. Colonialism came, therefore, with new state 
structures, strange to diverse and sometimes incompatible groups of 
3   Alonso-Concheiro 1991: 75.
4   Irele 1992: 33.
5   Ibid.
6   Ekeh 1983: 11.232
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people.7 It trust the colonised people into the world capitalist system 
dominated by metropolitan forces operating under harsh individual-
ism: a new world in which the people were ill-equipped to compete. 
As a result, barely after independence the affected political and geo-
graphical unit is enmeshed in a predicament marked by underdevel-
opment, fragile state structure and the crisis of legitimacy.8
It has been argued however, that the African contact with 
Europe was to expose the former to the values of modernisation, 
an important stage of development.9 The people were introduced 
to a new world order, sucked into a vortex of social and cultural 
change. There was a reconstitution of the traditional modes of pro-
duction and governance, social organisation, cultural expression and 
fundamental norms. In short, the colonial experience was seen as 
a confrontational with triumphant Western modernity.10 The point 
made in this paper is that the supposedly transformative colonial 
experience did not yield in Africa the type of society that industrial 
transformation created in Europe. This is the point of the human-
istic consideration. The argument is that certain humanistic values 
shaped by the enlightenment are known to have constituted an im-
portant component of the Western model of modernisation. But in 
introducing the Western model of modernisation in the context of 
colonialism, these values were missing.11
The Humanistic Consideration
The consideration takes human nature, its limits and interests 
as its theme. It recognises the dignity of man, making him the measure 
of things. The humanistic project always aims at discovering for man 
and in man, the spirit of freedom. This alone provides justification for 
man’s claim to rational autonomy, allowing him to see himself as in-
volved in nature and history and capable of making them his realm.12
7   Ekeh 1983: 31.
8   Ekeh 1983: 32.
9   Masolo 1992: 67.
10  Koka 1995: 50.
11   Irele 1992: 34.
12  Blackham 1963: 10.233
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The  permanent  roots  of  the  humanistic  consideration  are 
recognisable in tow related fundamental quests of universal import. 
These are: (1) Free inquiry and (2) Social Agreement.13
Free Inquiry
According to the notion of free inquiry, each must think and 
decide for himself on questions concerning the life he has and his 
conduct of it, and nothing is exempt from human question.14 In this 
understanding, there is no imemorable tradition or authority which 
can be used as a standard for interpreting human experience. Ex-
perience is to be interpreted in the light of further experience, the 
sole source of all standards of reason and values for ever open to 
questioning. Free inquiry however, is not irresponsible thinking. It 
is methodical and systematic, having established agreement, and 
tradition.15 In other word, it has its own criteria and system of con-
trol. It may be a free inquiry, but an organised free inquiry.
In effect, if the validity of a policy or idea remains always 
open to question, if the results remain always subject to falsification 
by further experience, then we shall be able to continuously have 
some provisional, corrigible, progressive ideas which alone consti-
tute the standard of attainable certainty and reliability. This is an im-
portant characteristic of the mental framework to be adopted if we 
must recognise and select wise attitudes and policies for responding 
to the present condition and confronting the future. Another is social 
agreement.
Social Agreement
The humanistic consideration emphasises that social agree-
ments is a principal criterion for values as well as for facts, and for 
rules which concern everybody in a society.16 Human beings, become 
human in being socialised, and any society is instituted in the rules, 
customs, procedures by which conduct is regulated and cooperation 
13  Blackham 1963: 14. 
14  Shuttle 1996: 199.
15  Inquiries as a matter of fact are usually guided by rules, procedures and 
methods. Thus, even a free inquiry is an organised free inquiry.
16  Raskin 1986: 30.234
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secured, facilitated and maintained. For, if I am a party to a given 
set of rules or policies then such rules or policies are binding on me, 
and I am responsible for upholding and enforcing them on other par-
ties as well as for conforming to them. If these rules remain open to 
question and revision, and agreed procedures are provided by means 
of which to put them in question and try to obtain revision, then they 
are rational.17 In other words, the rules are rational and binding in so 
far as they are provisional. Thus, we have the positive correlation of 
rationality and obligation with the provisional character of rules. In-
deed, the kind of agreement needed for living together is agreement 
such as about conventions (such as high way code), about procedures 
(such as parliament), about rights (as with Civil liberties) and about 
mutual expectations (from common honesty to neighbour help).18
Upon this foundation of social cooperation, different ultimate 
beliefs governing different ideals of life and styles of living may co-
exist in equal security. Not only is such a social foundation good for 
order, it is also good for the productive cooperation which furnishes 
means and multiplies opportunities. In other words, it creates that 
practicability of purpose which is the concrete content of freedom.19 
Combining both criteria of free inquiry and social agreement, the 
humanist would note:
By all means, let the struggle for men’s minds and heart go 
on, by all fair and peaceful means. But let it be remembered 
that the renunciation of all other means is a matter of social 
agreement; and this is a condition that has to be worked for.20
The point of a humanistic mode of philosophy for Africa (and 
for any people) proposed in this paper rests on the ground that the 
problems before us are (universal) problems of human life and exis-
tence; and any philosophy that must be taken seriously is that which 
will enable each individual to think independently. Beyond this, 
a  humanistic  mode  of  philosophy  encourages  open-mindedness, 
17  Ibid.
18  Raskin 1986: 31.
19  Ibid,
20  This is the reading of Voltaire’s Treaties On Tolerance rendered in 1949 
by Palmiro Togliatti, Secretary of Italian Communist Party in a Preface to a party 
reproduction of Voltaire’s Works: exert from H. J. Blackham, op.cit., p. 21.235
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civil responsibility, understanding and tolerance among individuals 
and groups. Thus, we would have independently-minded, thought-
ful people, prepared to shoulder their responsibilities with regards 
to the great questions of contemporary African world. To enhance 
this, the humanistic mode strengthens our capacity for judgement 
by stimulating our insight in different cultures, comparison of what 
each has to offer, analyses of what brings them closer together and 
what separates them. Our proposed humanistic mode of philosophy, 
in encouraging free inquiry, does not consider any truth (about hu-
man condition) as final, demanding respect for the convictions of 
individuals and accepts no doctrine that denies the liberty of others 
or that affront human dignity.21
When employed in economic policies, the humanistic mode 
discourages unlimited free-market economy which insists that the 
distribution of wealth must occur entirely according to the dictates 
of market forces. The central dogma of this theory (as expressed 
by Adam Smith, the founding father of capitalist theory, in his The 
Wealth of Nations, 1776) is the belief that in an entirely free economy, 
each citizen, through seeking his own gain, would be “led by an in-
visible hand to promote an end which was not part of his intention,” 
namely, the prosperity of society. This does happen sometimes; but 
to say that it invariably must happen as if ordained by a given natural 
law is a view which can mount to a form of economic superstition. 
Thus, the humanistic posture rejects automatic beneficence of market 
forces: the end result of market forces must be scrutinised, and if nec-
essary, corrected in the name of natural law, social justices, human 
right and the common good.22 Left to themselves, market forces are 
just as likely to lead to evil results as to good ones. A most important 
point always overlooked is that Adam Smith did not envisage mar-
kets operation in a value-free society, but assumed that individual 
consumer choices would be governed by moral considerations.23
When properly regulated in the name of the common good, 
market forces can constitute efficient mechanism for matching re-
21  The Common Good: A Generla Statement of Catholic Bishops Conference 
of England and Wales, published by the Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria, 
Lagos, 1996, p. 21. 
22  Ibid., p.21
23  Ibid., p.21236
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sources to needs; for no other system has so far shown itself superior 
in encouraging wealth creation and hence in advancing the prosper-
ity of the society, and enabling poverty and hardship to be relieved. 
In  contrast,  centrally  commanded  economies  will  be  inefficient, 
wasteful and unresponsive to human needs, nor can they foster a 
climate of personal liberty. In a market economy, the existence of 
wide variety of consumer choice means that individual decisions 
can be made according to individual wants and needs, thus, respect-
ing certain aspects of human freedom and following certain social 
and political arrangements.24
On the fundamental features of society, the humanistic mode 
embraces two features of a modern society: democracy and human 
right. In the case of democracy, the position is that democracy can 
never be a self-fulfilling justification for policies that are intrinsical-
ly evil. If it is to be healthy, democracy requires more than universal 
suffrage: it requires a system of common (humanistic) values if it is 
not to become a democratic tyranny in which the majority oppresses 
the minority. It is necessary for the public to have an understanding 
of the common good and the concepts that underlie it. Otherwise, 
they will be unlikely to support actions by public authority that is 
not to the immediate advantage of the majority. Furthermore, pub-
lic confidence is undermined, and democracy subverted when the 
members of public authority responsible for the common good are 
not appointed democratically or an objective merit, but in order to 
ensure that the authority in question has a political complexion fa-
vourable to the government of the day. To avoid such a situation, 
the humanistic mode encourages that decisions are taken as close to 
the grass root as good governance allows; emphasising the point of 
solidarity-that we are all responsible for each other.25
With regards to human rights, these are sometimes advanced to 
support claims to individual autonomy which are inappropriate, mor-
ally speaking. The proliferation of alleged ‘rights’ can devalue the 
very concept. So is the amplification of right without same conception 
of the common good to which all have obligation to contribute.26
24  Ibid., p.22
25  Ibid., p.10
26  Graneb 1997: 120.237
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Conclusion 27
The African people are perhaps, not alone in facing the prob-
lems to which attentions is drawn in this paper. But they should be-
ware of the tendency to look outside for solution. Yet, to reduce the 
‘solution’ to ‘African’, as its leasers seem to push, is to fall into the 
contradiction of unlimited relativism. Furthermore, the problems 
are not simply political, neither are they reducible to economic only.
The crisis concerns loss of individual beliefs and confusion 
over personal moral behaviour. The identifiable moods of African 
nation- states display a society ill-at-ease with itself. There is a loss 
of confidence in the public arena. And so, people seek space for 
personal fulfilment by turning increasingly to their private world. 
There is a retreat from community involvement to the domestic and 
individuals spheres. Thus, the very place where satisfaction and se-
curity are sought becomes the place where they are less likely to 
be obtained. The philosophical framework outlined in this paper is 
a necessary condition for a fair and prosperous society. A society 
without genuine humanistic values will show many of the symp-
toms which are present in contemporary Africa.
Primljeno: 31. mart 2011.
Prihvaćeno: 15. jun 2011.
Literature
Abiola Irele, „The Crisis of Legitimacy in Africa“, Dissent, Summer, 1992, 
p. 32.
Alonso-Concheiro, Antonio, Culture and Economy .The Futures of Culture, 
Volume 1: Meeting of the working group on the Futures of Culture 
held in Paris, 9-10 January 1990; Published by UNESCO in De-
cember 1991, p. 74.
Blackham H. J., „Humanism: The Subject of Objection: An Introduction“, 
in H. J. Blackham (ed), Objections to Humanism, London: Con-
stable and Co. Inc. 1963, p. 10.
Ekeh Peter P., „Colonialism and Social Structure“, University of Ibadan 
Inaugural Lecture, Ibadan University Press, 1983, p. 11.
27  This is a domestication of the position of Catholic Bishops Conference of 
England and Wales, op.cit., especially, as the position holds for the African Society. 238
I
s
A
A
c
 
E
.
 
U
k
p
O
k
O
L
O
Graneb, Anke (1997), „The problem of Identity in the African Context“, 
Studies in Intercultural Philosophy.
Koka D. K. (1995), „The impact of Eurocentric system of education on the 
African mind: Decolonizing the mind (process)“, in Decolonizing 
The Mind, Proceedings of the second Colloquium on African Phi-
losophy held at the Unviersity of South Africa, Pretoria. Published 
by Research Unit for African Philosophy (UNSA).
Masolo D. A. (1992), „History and the Modernisation of African Philos-
ophy: A Reading of Kwasi Wiredu“, in Hereurgegeben Von, et al 
(ed.), Post Colonial Philosophy in Africa, R. Oldenbourg Verlag 
Wien Munchen.
Shuttle A. (1996), Philosophy for Africa, South Africa: University of Cape 
Town Press.
Raskin Marcus G., The Common Good: Its Politics, Policies and Philso-
phy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986.
The Common Good: A General Statement of Catholic Bishops Conference 
of England and Wales, published by the Catholic Bishops Confer-
ence of Nigeria, Lagos, 1996.
Isak Upkopolo
O SAVREMENOM AFRIČKOM ISKUSTVU: 
KA HUMANISTIČKOM VIDU FILOZOFIJE ZA AFRIKU
Rezime
Nema sumnje da je danas Afrika suočena s mnoštvom ekonomskih, politič-
kih, društvenih i razvojnih problema. Veliko pitanje i osnovni izazov, otud, jesu koji 
je najbolji način da se uhvatimo u koštac s tim problemima, posebno kako sve dublje 
zalazimo u treći milenijum. Ovaj članak pokušava da osvetli temeljnu ulogu koju 
filozofija može igrati s obzirom na pomenuto. On zastupa stanovište da filozofija, 
kao humanistička disciplina, može pomoći u oblikovanju svežih ideja koje su po 
svojoj prirodi humanističke u smislu da podstiču slobodno istraživanje i društveni 
sporazum koji su vitalni oslonci za jedno pravedno i napredno društvo; jer, društvo 
bez takvih genunih humanističkih vrednosti pokazivaće mnoge simptome koji su 
prisutni u savremenim afričkim društvima. 
Ključne reči: Humanizam, Afrika, filozofija, slobodno istraživanje, društve-
ni sporazum. 